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What's Law Got to Do with It? 
Suzanna Sherry 
claim its significance, yet suggest that the results prove 
their model a success. As a legal expert, I have a rather 
different perspective on the results. I look at the numbers 
holistically, not statistically. And what I see tells a different 
story-if it tells any story at all. 
The classification trees used by the model to generate 
predictions are a mass of tangled branches, because one 
justice's predicted vote often turns on another justice's pre- 
dicted vote. By looking at the predominant variables for 
each justice, however, one can conclude that the predic- 
tions for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter ultimately 
turn substantially on the predicted vote ofJustice O'Connor, 
while the predicted votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas turn substantially on the pre- 
dicted vote of Justice Scalia. By looking at the classification 
trees for Justices O'Connor and Scalia, then, we can learn a 
great deal about how the model works for eight of the nine 
justices. Moreover, the model beat the experts at predicting 
both O'Connor and Scalia; indeed, the largest gap between 
man and machine was in predicting how Justice O'Connor 
would vote. 
So how did the model predict the votes of O'Connor 
and Scalia? For both justices, the first variable on the clas- 
sification tree is whether the lower court decision was lib- 
eral or conservative. For Justice O'Connor,' the model 
predicts that she will always reverse a liberal lower-court 
decision. Whether she will reverse a conservative lower- 
court decision depends, first, on the circuit of origin (she 
will affirm cases from the Second, Third, DC, and Federal 
circuits), then on whether the respondent is the United 
States, and finally on the subject matter of the case. For 
Justice Scalia, the tree is slightly more complicated and 
slightly more tied to subject matter (see fig. 1). Again, how- 
ever, besides the ideological classification fthe lower-court 
decision, the circuit of origin plays a large role: for conser- 
vative lower court decisions, Scalia will always affirm cases 
from the Third, Fourth, Tenth, DC, and Federal circuits, 
but will affirm only some types of cases from the other 
circuits; for liberal ower court decisions (in certain subject 
areas), he will affirm cases from the First, Third, Sixth, Sev- 
enth, Eighth, and DC circuits and reverse cases from the 
other circuits. Anyone who follows the politics in, quality 
of, or splits among the federal courts of appeals will recog- 
nize that these collections of circuits have little or nothing 
in common-they seem completely random. 
While the study's authors suggest that the "circuit of ori- 
gin" variable has to do with "the agenda process," one should 
still expect to find some commonalities among the circuits 
that particular justices favor or disfavor. I find none. While 
I do not expect the study's authors to be able to fully explain 
why their predictive model works, I am troubled when even 
with hindsight we cannot make sense of the variable. 
The classification trees for these two pivotal justices-on 
whose votes many of the other predictions rely-thus rest 
first on politics and second on a completely inexplicable 
factor. Leaving the latter aside for a moment, the emphasis 
on politics makes the model strongly attitudinal. So what 
are we to make of the fact that the experts also say they 
relied on an attitudinal model? However we explain it, we 
must also account for two striking results: the differences in 
which justices each method was better at predicting, and 
the differences inrelative success rates of the two methods 
depending on the issue area of the case. 
First, there is a significant difference b tween the model 
and the experts when it comes to predicting the votes of 
particular justices.2 When the justices are arrayed fro'm least 
to most conservative, the expert success rate forms a rough 
sideways V; they are least successful at predicting the cen- 
trist justices. The model's success rate on the same chart, 
however, isalmost an evenly increasing percentage; the model 
is worst at predicting the liberal justices, better for the cen- 
trists, and best for the conservatives. 
Second, comparing success rates for individual justices 
by subject area produces interesting outcomes, as table 1 
shows. In criminal procedure, the experts bested the model 
for five of the nine justices, but for most of the justices the 
margins were small, less than five percentage points, and for 
all the justices it was less than ten. In civil rights, the model 
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Figure 1 
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beat the experts on five of the nine justices, by larger 
margins-in four instances by more than ten percentage 
points. In the economic activity area, the model signifi- 
cantly outperformed the experts, beating them regularly by 
20-30 percentage points. Even in those two fields, how- 
ever, the experts managed to predict some justices better 
than did the model.3 
The experts turned the tables in cases with less political 
salience. In federalism cases4 their predictions of individual 
justices' votes were more accurate than the model's in the aggre- 
gate by a large margin: 70.4 percent to 53.5 percent. And in 
cases involving judicial power, the experts swept the field, out- 
predicting the model on every justice, and racking 
up success rates that were 7.9 to 82.2 percentage points above 
those of the model. As the authors point out, these statistics 
might be questioned because of the small number of cases 
and the flexibility in individual coding decisions, but they 
are intriguing nonetheless. 
What might explain all of these facts? I suggest that the 
liberal justices vote the law, the conservative justices vote 
their politics, and the centrist justices do neither.5 Consider 
the evidence regarding the different attitudinalist approaches 
of the model and the experts. Both the classification trees 
and the fact that the model did poorly in areas with low 
political salience-and best in cases involving civil rights 
and regulation of economic activity, which have perhaps 
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Table 1 
Percent correct model and expert forecasts of votes, by justice and issue area 
Criminal procedure Civil rights Economic activity Federalism Judicial power 
Justice Model Experts Model Experts Model Experts Model Experts Model Experts 
Rehnquist 69.2 77.8 85.7 91.4 81.2 51.3 80.0 33.3 75.0 84.2 
Stevens 84.6 80.6 57.1 68.6 56.2 64.1 40.0 100.0 50.0 84.2 
O'Connor 76.9 75.0 64.3 48.6 86.7 55.6 60.0 58.3 37.5 68.4 
Scalia 84.6 75.0 78.6 97.1 75.0 48.7 60.0 50.0 37.5 68.4 
Kennedy 69.2 77.8 85.7 82.4 75.0 51.3 100.0 75.0 50.0 57.9 
Souter 84.6 61.1 85.7 57.1 56.2 61.5 20.0 91.7 25.0 73.7 
Thomas 84.6 86.1 85.7 94.3 60.0 50.0 80.0 58.3 37.5 68.4 
Ginsburg 76.9 77.8 71.4 60.0 62.5 59.0 0.0 100.0 12.5 94.7 
Breyer 69.2 69.4 64.3 51.4 60.0 70.3 40.0 66.7 12.5 84.2 
Note: For criminal procedure (n = 13); civil rights (n = 14); economic activity (n= 16), judicial power (n = 8), and federalism (n = 5) cases. 
Issue areas are coded according to Spaeth's protocol, and are mutually exclusive. 
the highest political visibility-suggest that politics played 
a large role in the model's predictions. The experts, on the 
other hand, while confessing to using the justice's ideology 
in making their predictions, did worst in areas where one 
might expect an attitudinal- 
ist approach to succeed and 
best in more legalistic areas. 
Perhaps the experts did not 
actually focus on ideology, 
or perhaps they are just poor 
attitudinalists. Maybe they 
simply tempered their atti- 
tudinalist predictions with 
knowledge about the extent to which politics influences 
each particular justice, using an attitudinalist model for 
only some justices. (The questionnaires asked the experts 
what factors they considered for each case, not each justice, 
so they might have used ideology for only some justices.) In 
any case, despite the protests of the study's authors, it seems 
fair to suggest that the model adopted a more attitudinalist 
approach (with some additional nuances) and the experts a 
more legalist approach (again, with some nuances, and per- 
haps only for some justices). 
It is then easy to explain the model's pattern of success. 
The more conservative the justice, the larger the role played 
by ideology and the more accurate the model's attitudinal- 
ist prediction. Moreover, this explanation is consistent with 
the facts surrounding the appointment of each justice. The 
most conservative justices-Scalia, Thomas, and Rehn- 
quist-were nominated (or elevated) by conservative Repub- 
lican presidents for whom ideology played an important 
role in the selection process, and confirmed by a Republi- 
can Senate or by a narrow margin that included only a few 
Democrats. Two of the four liberal justices, however, were 
nominated by Republicans-how ideological could they 
be?-and the other two by a moderate Democrat with only 
token opposition from Senate Republicans.6 This might 
also explain the experts' ability to predict the three most 
conservative justices almost as well as the model does: their 
reliance on attitudinalism ay have been strongest for the 
justices they perceived as most ideologically committed. 
For the four most liberal 
justices, the model fared 
poorly using an attitudinal- 
ist approach to predict their 
votes-much worse than it 
did for the conservatives. 
The experts, however, pre- 
dicted the liberal justices 
almost as well as they did 
the conservatives. And their predictions were most accurate 
overall-ranging from a low of 58 percent for Justice Ken- 
nedy to a high of 95 percent for Justice Ginsburg-on cases 
raising questions of judicial power. The experts' success rate 
was higher than 70 percent for all four liberal justices in this 
area (see table 1). This pattern is exactly the converse of the 
one we find in the model's predictions of the liberals' votes, 
confirming that the experts were using a legalist, rather 
than attitudinalist, approach-at least for the liberal jus- 
tices. And, indeed, the questionnaires confirm that the legal 
experts used legal precedent and legal analysis-again, at 
least for predicting some justices. 
If the model uses a predominantly attitudinalist approach 
throughout, and the experts use a legalist approach most of 
the time but an attitudinalist approach for the conservative 
justices, what can we conclude about the various justices from 
the pattern of success rates? Legalism, but not attitudinal- 
ism, is a better way to predict the votes of the four liberals 
because they place more emphasis on law than on politics. 
Attitudinalism, however, works just fine for the three con- 
servatives (except in cases in which politics is unimportant), 
because their votes in fact depend more on politics than on 
law. In other words, the liberals vote the law and the conser- 
vatives vote their politics, as I contended earlier. 
Liberal justices vote the law, the conservative 
justices vote their politics, and the centrist 
justices do neither. 
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What about the two centrists, Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy? One possibility is that attitudinalism predicts their 
votes fairly accurately (although not as accurately as it does 
for the conservatives), but that the experts don't recognize 
that fact as well as they do with the more conservative jus- 
tices. The experts' mistaken assumption that O'Connor and 
Kennedy behave like the liberals-looking at the law more 
than at politics-produces the distinctive V-shape, and the 
two justices' failure to conform entirely to an attitudinalist 
approach puts O'Connor and Kennedy about in the mid- 
dle of the model's success rate. This suggests that neither 
legalism nor attitudinalism accurately captures the influ- 
ences on these two justices. But such an explanation leaves 
us with a question: what does determine how O'Connor 
and Kennedy will vote? 
Which brings us back to the additional factors on the clas- 
sification trees. For Kennedy, the only nonpolitical variable is 
the circuit of origin; for O'Connor, the circuit of origin is the 
most important variable after the political slant of the lower- 
court decision, although she also favors plaintiffs with civil 
rights, economic liberties, or first amendment claims against 
the United States, and states' rights. (She is a libertarian "fed- 
eralist," in other words-unsurprising considering that her 
background includes a stint in a sagebrush legislature.)7 But 
why does the circuit of origin explain what neither law nor 
politics can? I find that conclusion nothing short of bizarre. 
Something else must be going on, and the apparent influ- 
ence of circuit of origin is simply coincidental. 
What is the something else? I am afraid that it might be 
pure gut reaction, the "I know it when I see it" of Justice 
Stewart's definition of pornography.8 As the study authors 
note, "the legal experts put great weight on legal authority- 
primarily in the form of prior Supreme Court opinions-in 
making their predictions." And yet the experts were worst 
at predicting Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, suggesting 
perhaps that these two justices do not themselves place very 
much weight on legal authority.9 
And, in fact, the votes of the two justices-especially 
O'Connor-in some key cases of the 2002 term illustrate a 
rather cavalier attitude toward precedent. Justice Kennedy, 
at least, was forthright in his rejection of precedent in Law- 
rence v. Texas, voting to overrule the 17-year-old Bowers v. 
Hardwick. Justice O'Connor in Lawrence was less candid 
on the inconsistency between her vote and her prior views: 
in 1986 she joined an opinion that essentially held that 
homosexuals had no rights which heterosexuals were bound 
to respect, but then ruled in Lawrence that legislatures could 
not rationally criminalize homosexual sodomy without crim- 
inalizing heterosexual sodomy as well. (I am not suggesting 
that Bowers should not have been overruled, only that 
Lawrence-and particularly Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion-illustrates the centrists' quirky decision making.) 
Justice O'Connor was also a pivotal vote-and in one 
case the author of the opinion-in three other cases that 
paid only lip service to precedent. In Nevada Department 
ofHuman Resources v.Hibbs, she joined a majority uphold- 
ing Congress's abrogation of state sovereign immunity in 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, thus allowing states to 
be sued for damages by individuals who claimed that their 
state employer violated the FMLA. Prior cases had invali- 
dated similar attempted abrogations under the Age Dis- 
crimination in Employment Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, concluding that Congress did not have 
sufficient evidence of a pattern of state constitutional vio- 
lations to enact remedial statutes. The evidence of state 
constitutional violations supporting the FMLA, however, 
was no stronger than the evidence supporting the ADA. 
Moreover, of the eight circuits that had previously con- 
fronted the question, seven had found the FMLA abroga- 
tion invalid under the precedents-further evidence that 
the Court's decision was inconsistent with its prior cases. 
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, 
joined by O'Connor, purported to apply the earlier prec- 
edent. O'Connor and Rehnquist were the only justices 
who were in the majority in both the earlier cases and in 
Hibbs, again suggesting that their view of the precedent 
was unusual.10 
In Demore v. Kim, Justice O'Connor provided the fifth 
vote upholding the constitutionality of detaining deport- 
able aliens pending a deportation hearing, without any indi- 
vidualized determination of their dangerousness or risk of 
flight. Only two years earlier, she had provided the fifth 
vote in Zadvydas v. Davis, which held unconstitutional the 
detention of aliens who had been ordered deported (after a 
hearing) but who were required to remain in the United 
States because no other nation would accept them. Other 
than Justice O'Connor, there is no overlap in the majorities 
in the two cases, suggesting that perhaps they are inconsis- 
tent. While the cases may arguably be distinguishable on 
their facts, what is noteworthy is that the majority opinion 
in Demore cites Justice Kennedy's Zadvydas dissent more 
than it cites the Zadvydas majority opinion. 
Finally, consider Grutter v. Bollinger, in which the Court 
upheld the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative 
action program. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion pur- 
ported to apply strict scrutiny, which requires that the affir- 
mative action program be "necessary to" or "narrowly tailored 
to achieve" the state's compelling interest in a racially diverse 
student body. She nevertheless deferred to the university's 
own determination of the benefits of a racially diverse stu- 
dent body, the lack of alternative methods of obtaining a
racially diverse student body, and the temporary nature of 
the program. The Court has never before upheld a racially 
discriminatory state policy under strict scrutiny, nor has it 
ever suggested that the challenged program is due any def- 
erence from the Court. Instead, it has always demanded 
that such programs be subjected to the most searching scru- 
tiny. (Three of the four justices who joined her opinion 
explicitly rejected the application of ordinary strict scrutiny 
to affirmative action.)1" Moreover, on the same day that it 
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upheld the Law School's affirmative action program, the 
Court struck down the affirmative action program used by 
the University of Michigan in undergraduate admissions. 
Only Justices O'Connor and Breyer were in the majority in 
both cases. As the dissenters in both cases pointed out, the 
only difference between the undergraduate program and 
the law program was that the undergraduate program was 
more candid about the role played by race. 
These cases provide anecdotal evidence that complements 
the project's results. Over the course of the term, Justices Ken- 
nedy and O'Connor (especially O'Connor) confounded 
experts who relied on legal precedent to predict their votes. 
In these cases, we can see how Justice O'Connor (and, to a 
lesser extent and more candidly, Justice Kennedy) treats prec- 
edent, which explains why legal experts were unable to pre- 
dict her votes. We are now left only to explain why Justice 
O'Connor's erratic votes-based on neither precedent nor 
politics-seem to track such odd variables as circuit of origin. 
If one steps back from individual cases in which a justice 
misapplied precedent, however, there is another possible 
explanation for the experts' poor performance in predicting 
the centrists' votes, although it does not explain the relative 
success of the computer model. If Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor are taking an essentially pragmatist approach to 
legal questions-exploring every angle and relying heavily 
on fact-specific context-their decisions might be more dif- 
ficult o predict, especially if the experts themselves were 
not pragmatists (or did not read Kennedy and O'Connor as 
pragmatists). Were it not for the lack of candor exhibited in 
the manipulation of precedent, this result might actually be 
encouraging, suggesting that the two justices engage in a 
typical common-law decision-making process.12 
But perhaps the model's ability to predict Justice 
O'Connor better than the experts is a fluke. In other words, 
there might also be nothing going on. The authors admit 
that the study is of limited significance because of its nec- 
essarily narrow focus, the small number of cases, and the 
unscientific selection of experts."3 There is also a serious 
problem with relying on coding decisions, especially those 
created and applied by nonlawyers. The coding choices are 
inevitably ambiguous, and inevitably lead to internal incon- 
sistencies. For example, the difference between "judicial 
power" and "federalism" is fuzzy, especially in any case 
raising the question of whether a federal court-as opposed 
to a state court-has jurisdiction. And, as noted above, 
several obvious (to lawyers) federalism cases were coded as 
economic activity cases-presumably by nonlawyers; a dif- 
ferent coder might have made a different choice. Indeed, 
different coders do make different choices. Harold Spaeth 
originally coded about half the 68 cases in the sample. The 
project authors tentatively coded the other half, which 
Spaeth later recoded. Of the approximately 34 cases (half 
of 68) that Spaeth recoded, 16 were given different codes. 
Leaving aside the problem of "predictive" recoding after 
the Supreme Court has already issued its ruling, the fact 
that Spaeth and the project authors disagreed about the 
appropriate coding in almost half the cases they both coded 
suggests the impossibility of consistent coding.14 
Finally, the idea that every decision-whether by a lower 
court or by the Supreme Court-can be coherently coded 
as either "liberal" or "conservative" verges on nonsense. How, 
for example, should one code Nguyen v. United States, in 
which a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld a criminal con- 
viction against various criminal procedure challenges but 
the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that having a 
judge from the Mariana Islands (a federal judge but not an 
Article III judge) on the panel violated a federal statute? 
Unsurprisingly, the lineup in the Supreme Court was pecu- 
liar: Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
In addition to coding decisions, the results are also highly 
dependent on the particular cases in the sample, and there 
is evidence to suggest that this term's cases are unrepresen- 
tative of this Court in general. It was widely suggested that 
the Court was unusually and surprisingly liberal in the 2002 
term.15 Some statistics bear this out. Of the 16 cases, or 
parts of cases, that were decided by a 5-4 majority, the five 
most conservative justices were in the majority in five cases 
and the four most liberal were in the majority in seven (in 
the remaining four cases, the majority consisted of a mix of 
conservatives and liberals). Of the 12 cases or parts of cases 
decided by a 6-3 vote, there were four in which the five 
most conservative justices were in the majority, and five in 
which the four most liberal justices were. (Again, the remain- 
ing cases were mixed.) This is the first ime in this Court's 
nine years that the liberals won more close cases than the 
conservatives. The far right justices, Scalia and Thomas, 
were the most frequent dissenters; in past terms the far left 
Justice Stevens has been the most frequent dissenter. More- 
over, the Fourth Circuit, the most conservative inthe nation, 
was the least reversed circuit for the 2001 term (with a 
reversal rate of 64 percent) but had a reversal rate of 100 
percent for the 2002 term. While none of these results are 
likely to be statistically significant, they do tend to confirm 
the impression of an unusually liberal term. 
If this term was in fact aberrational, and especially if the 
pivotal votes of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were 
unusual, then the fact that the project's results are statisti- 
cally significant for this term is unlikely to be repeated. This 
term simply might have been one of the 2.5 percent of cases 
in which these results could be produced by random chance. 
Here's a challenge to the model from one expert: try again 
in a more representative term (and with experts who have 
less intellectual stake in the outcomes) and we'll beat you 
fair and square. 
Conclusion 
They say that no news is good news. This study is either no 
news or bad news. Either the results are an artifact of a 
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peculiar term, poor coding, and the wrong experts, or the 
results tell us that the votes of two pivotal Supreme Court 
justices depend on either politics or seemingly random fac- 
tors. Those of us who have spent years arguing that consti- 
tutional aw is truly law, not just politics, and that judges do 
the best they can, were disheartened in late 2000 by Bush v. 
Gore. Most of us recovered. Now comes the new millen- 
nium and a computer model to inform us that we regained 
our confidence too soon. Personally, I'd rather have no news. 
Notes 
A complete reference list for the entire symposium appears on 
pp. 791-93, below. 
1 See Martin et al. 2004, fig. 1, for O'Connor's classifi- 
cation tree. 
2 Ibid., fig. 2. 
3 Moreover, the results depend significantly on question- 
able coding decisions: 4 of the 16 cases coded as eco- 
nomic activity are, I would suggest, really federalism 
or judicial power cases. Pierce County v. Guillen raised 
the question whether Congress was entitled to make 
certain highway information collected by the state-as 
required by federal statute-undiscoverable and 
inadmissible in state civil litigation. Cook County v. 
United States ex rel. Chandler determined that coun- 
ties are "persons" subject to qui tam actions; it was 
a follow-up to an earlier case holding that states are not 
persons in that context because otherwise the qui 
tam statute would raise grave constitutional (federal- 
ism) questions. Pharmaceutical Research andManu- 
facturers ofAmerica v. Walsh and Hillside Dairy Inc. v. 
Lyons both involved the dormant Commerce Clause 
(and, in Walsh, preemption), which implicates federal- 
ism because it is part of the constitutional scheme 
of balancing national and local interests. For 
further discussion of coding difficulties, see below, 
p. 773. 
4 Federalism may have political salience in some cases, 
but did not have much last term. Other than Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v.Hibbs, the feder- 
alism cases had neither high visibility nor significant 
political impact. The cases included one on ERISA, 
which no citizen understands (much less cares about); 
one on whether the federal Boat Safety Act pre- 
empts a state cause of action; and one on utilities regu- 
lation. The only federalism case (besides Hibbs) that 
was conceivably political was American Insurance Asso- 
ciation v. Garamendi, which invalidated California's 
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act; but any case in 
which Justice Ginsburg writes a dissent hat is joined 
by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas con- 
founds political classification. The addition of the cases 
in note 2 would not alter my conclusion that this 
term's federalism cases had low political salience. Whether 
it would change the success rates of the model cannot 
be determined without rerunning the program. 
5 I am characterizing Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg 
and Breyer as liberal, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas as conservative, and 
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as centrist. This 
accords with the project authors' array of justices 
in figure 2. 
6 Chief Justice Rehnquist was originally nominated by 
Republican Richard Nixon and confirmed by a 68-26 
vote in a Democrat-controlled Senate. He was ele- 
vated to chief justice by Republican Ronald Reagan and 
confirmed by a 65-33 vote in a Republican- 
controlled Senate. Justice Scalia was nominated by 
Reagan and confirmed by the same Republican- 
controlled Senate (on the same day). Justice Thomas 
was nominated by Republican George H. W. Bush 
and confirmed by a 52-48 vote in a Democrat- 
controlled Senate; only 11 Democrats voted in 
favor. Justice Stevens was nominated by Republican Ger- 
ald Ford and Justice Souter by Republican George 
H. W. Bush. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were nomi- 
nated by Democrat Bill Clinton and confirmed by 
a Democrat-controlled Senate by margins of 96-3 and 
87-9, respectively. 
7 "Sagebrush" states are often described as libertarian i so- 
far as they favor less governmental regulation, espe- 
cially of businesses. See Eskridge 1995. 
8 Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). 
9 I once suggested that one might explain Justice 
O'Connor's votes at least partly on the basis of gender 
(Sherry 1986). Justice O'Connor has explicitly 
rejected my suggestion (O'Connor 2003). 
10 For a more detailed examination of the use of prec- 
edent in this case (as well as those in the following para- 
graphs), see Sherry 2003. 
11 In Gratz v. Bollinger, Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opin- 
ion, joined in relevant part by Justices Souter and 
Breyer, argued that the equal protection clause per- 
mits the government to "distinguish between policies of 
exclusion and inclusion," and race should not auto- 
matically be a "'suspect' category" in the affirmative 
action context. 
12 On this type of legal pragmatism, see Farber and 
Sherry 2002. 
13 It is also possible that the experts' success rate was 
depressed by a "wishful-thinking" bias. Drawn from 
the ranks of those who were expert in the particular 
field, the experts came into the project with definite 
conclusions about how cases ought to be decided. In at 
least some instances, that may have influenced their 
predictions of how the case was going to be 
decided. The most glaring example is Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, in which all three xperts predicted that 
the Supreme Court would reverse the lower court 
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and strike down the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act; the Court upheld it by a 7-2 vote. 
(The model correctly predicted the result, although not 
the exact vote.) I am no copyright expert, and 
as a constitutional scholar I would have thought 
reversal highly unlikely. But to those who are experts 
in the law of intellectual property, the CTEA was 
deeply flawed and should have been struck down. 
If only a few of the cases included experts whose 
own expertise convinced them that the Court simply 
had to agree with them, it would throw off the 
success rate. 
In the interest of full disclosure, I should report 
that my own success rate was dismal. In the three cases 
I predicted, I was wrong on the outcome every time 
(as were all the other experts in all three cases). The 
model, on the other hand, correctly predicted the 
outcome-although not the individual justices-in 
each of the three. 
14 It is irrelevant that Spaeth's postdecision coding appar- 
ently shows high intercoder agreement. Predictive cod- 
ing requires making decisions about the subject area 
of a case before the Supreme Court has focused the 
issues. The Court's opinion has the effect of highlight- 
ing some issues and suppressing others, making the cod- 
ing more predictable. See Epstein and Knight 1998. 
Thus Spaeth's disagreement with the initial coding both 
undermines the validity of the predictions and illus- 
trates the difficulties ofpredecision coding. 
15 Greenhouse 2003j; Lane 2003. 
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